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Reuven S. Avi-Yonah* & Orli K. Avi-Yonah**
The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality
from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century. By Walter
Scheidel. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2017.
Pp. xvii, 444. $35.
Introduction
In 2014, a surprising best seller swept the United States. Capital in the
Twenty-First Century by the French economist Thomas Piketty was pub-
lished in English translation in April 2014.1 Less than two months later, the
English edition climbed to number one on the New York Times list for
hardcover fiction while becoming the greatest sales success in the history of
the Harvard University Press.2 By January 2015, the book had sold 1.5 mil-
lion copies in French, English, German, Chinese, and Spanish.3
The success of Piketty’s book stemmed from the aftermath of the Great
Recession of 2008–2009. The recession focused public attention on the in-
creasing inequality in the United States since the early 1970s. The “Occupy
Wall Street” movement, as well as the Tea Party movement, were both re-
sponses to the realization that, while the recession was over by 2009, over
95% of the subsequent growth in the U.S. economy inured to the benefit of
the top 1% of the income distribution.4
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
** Clinical Consultant, Family Assessment Clinic, Catholic Social Services of Washtenaw
County.
1. Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (2013).
2. Hardcover Nonfiction, N.Y. Times (May 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/books/
best-sellers/2014/05/18/hardcover-nonfiction/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review); see
Marc Tracy, Piketty’s ‘Capital’: A Hit that Was, Wasn’t, Then Was Again, New Republic (Apr.
24, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117498/pikettys-capital-sold-out-harvard-press-
scrambling [https://perma.cc/K7KS-FJ4U].
3. See Thomas Piketty Interview, by PSE, Paris School of Economics, https://
www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/en/news/thomas-piketty-interview-by-pse/ [https://perma.cc/
LD37-YK69].
4. See Emmanuel Saez, Income and Wealth Inequality: Evidence and Policy Implications,
35 Contemp. Econ. Pol’y 7, 16 (2017); Ed Pilkington, Occupy Wall Street: Tea Party Leaders
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Piketty explained this phenomenon in detail. Moreover, he posited that
it was a historical constant.5 The main driver of inequality, he argued, was
the tendency of returns on capital to exceed the rate of economic growth
(r>g):
In slowly growing economies, past wealth naturally takes on disproportion-
ate importance, because it takes only a small flow of new savings to in-
crease the stock of wealth steadily and substantially. If, moreover, the rate
of return on capital remains significantly above the growth rate for an ex-
tended period of time . . . then the risk of divergence in the distribution of
wealth is very high.6
Moreover, Piketty did not just pose the problem—he proposed a solu-
tion. In the last part of the book, Piketty advocated several steps to remedy
inequality by regulating capital: strengthening the welfare state, dramatically
increasing income tax rates on the rich, and imposing a new global tax on
capital.7 While none of these steps were taken, several of them were influen-
tial in shaping the Democratic platform for the 2016 presidential campaign,
especially through the impact of Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT).8
But, of course, the Democrats lost. The Republicans took the White
House, retained both houses of Congress, and immediately proceeded to
propose policies that went in the opposite direction of Piketty’s proposals.9
These policies consisted of first, abolishing the tax increases on wealthy
Americans that helped fund the Affordable Care Act (ACA);10 second, rolling
back the welfare state, as embodied in the ACA, and especially converting
Medicaid from an entitlement to a capped program;11 and third, proposing
5. See generally Piketty, supra note 1 (examining the discrepancy of income distribu-
tion in the United States).
6. Id. at 25.
7. Id. at 471–539.
8. See Democratic Platform Comm., 2016 Democratic Party Platform 5–6,
12–13 (2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/117717.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EBN7-YKYV]; John Cassidy, Bernie Sanders and the New Populism, New Yorker (Feb. 3,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/bernie-sanders-and-the-new-populism
[https://perma.cc/D3FY-3NSL].
9. Sarah Frostenson, Republicans Now Control the Presidency, the Senate, and the House,
Vox (Nov. 9, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/presidential-election/2016/11/9/13572972/
republicans-control-presidency-senate-house [https://perma.cc/QYX8-QLEH].
10. Scott Horsley, GOP Health Care Bill Would Cut About $765 Billion in Taxes over 10
Years, NPR (May 4, 2017, 6:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/05/04/526923181/gop-health-
care-bill-would-cut-about-765-billion-in-taxes-over-10-years (on file with the Michigan Law
Review).
11. Avik Roy, How Much Will the GOP’s Medicaid Per-Capita Cap Save, if Anything? CBO
Refuses to Say, Forbes (June 8, 2017, 12:27 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/
2017/06/08/how-much-will-the-gops-medicaid-per-capita-cap-save-if-anything-cbo-refuses-
to-say/#38b214d06376 [https://perma.cc/24TU-ME87].
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an extremely regressive tax reform, including cutting the top marginal indi-
vidual and corporate rates, abolishing the estate tax, and converting the cor-
porate tax (which falls primarily on capital) to a consumption tax (which
falls primarily on consumers).12
In this environment, a new book appeared. Stanford historian Walter
Scheidel’s The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the
Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century,13 is, in some respects, the anti-Piketty.
Scheidel accepts Piketty’s view that inequality tends to grow over time, but
adds a crucial caveat than runs directly opposite to Piketty’s optimistic pro-
posals. Scheidel argues that the historical record demonstrates that inequal-
ity can only be reduced by violent means.14 Therefore, Piketty’s proposals to
reduce inequality peacefully are unrealistic. Scheidel concludes his book by
arguing that we should accept inequality as the price of peace: “All of us who
prize greater economic equality would do well to remember that with the
rarest of exceptions, it was only ever brought forth in sorrow. Be careful
what you wish for” (p. 444).
This Review will first summarize Scheidel’s thesis and the evidence he
presents for his claim (Part I). It will then argue that the twentieth-century
history of the United States shows that, in fact, inequality can be reduced by
peaceful means, even though such reductions are not easy to achieve and
usually require bipartisan consensus (Part II). Next, the Review will address
why the Great Recession of 2008–2009 did not lead to a reduction in ine-
quality, unlike the Great Depression (Part III). Finally, the Review will ask
what can be done and propose certain steps that may be more achievable
than Piketty’s proposals (Part IV).
I. The Scheidel Thesis
Scheidel summarizes his thesis as follows:
For thousands of years, civilization did not lend itself to peaceful equaliza-
tion. Across a wide range of societies and different levels of development,
stability favored economic inequality. This was as true of Pharaonic Egypt
as it was of Victorian England, as true of the Roman Empire as of the
United States. Violent shocks were of paramount importance in disrupting
the established order, in compressing the distribution of income and
wealth, in narrowing the gap between rich and poor. Throughout recorded
12. Tax Reform Task Force, A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident
America—Tax 15–16 (2016), https://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-
PolicyPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMN3-TNC9]. For a critique, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah &
Kimberly A. Clausing, Problems with Destination-Based Corporate Taxes and the Ryan Blueprint
(Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 16-029, 2017), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2884903 [https://perma.cc/8RWY-XHMG].
13. Walter Scheidel is the Dickason Professor of Humanities, Stanford University.
14. P. 8 (“But were there also other, more peaceful mechanisms of lowering inequality? If
we think of leveling on a large scale, the answer must be no. Across the full sweep of history,
every single one of the major compressions of material inequality we can observe in the record
was driven by one or more of these four levelers.” (emphasis added)).
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history, the most powerful leveling invariably resulted from the most pow-
erful shocks. Four different kinds of violent ruptures have flattened ine-
quality: mass mobilization warfare, transformative revolution, state failure,
and lethal pandemics. (p. 6; emphasis added)
The rest of the book marshals powerful evidence in support of this the-
sis. First, Scheidel shows convincingly (and consistently with Piketty, but
Scheidel’s data stretches much further back in history) that in peaceful
times, inequality tends to grow. For example, historical data enable Scheidel
to show that inequality in Europe grew from prehistoric times to reach a
peak at the height of the Roman Empire (around 200 CE) (p. 87 fig.3.1),
declined with the downfall of the empire, rose again gradually from 650 CE
to the Black Death (1350 CE) (pp. 87 fig.3.1, 90), declined sharply and then
began rising again until the outbreak of World War I in 1914 (pp. 87 fig.3.1,
110, 112), then declined in the “Great Compression” or 1914–1975 (p. 87
fig.3.1, Chapter Five), and began rising again after the “Great Compression”
(p. 87 fig.3.1, Chapter Fifteen).
Similar trends are visible in the United States. The Gini coefficient,
which Scheidel uses as his main measure of inequality, rose from 0.44 in
1774 to 0.49 in 1850 to 0.51 in 1860, and the share of national income
earned by the top 1% of the income distribution rose from 8.5% in 1774 to
9.2% in 1850 to 10% in 1860.15 The Civil War reduced inequality in the
South but increased inequality in the North: the top 1% income share
reached 18% in 1913, and the fraction of all assets held by the wealthiest 1%
of U.S. households rose from 25% to 46% between 1810 and 1910 (p. 109).
In the long run, inequality in the United States increased steadily from 1650
to World War I (p. 110 fig.3.5). The American Revolution brought only a
small reduction and the Civil War produced none at all (p. 110 fig.3.5).
From World War I to 1970, however, inequality dropped sharply, rising
thereafter but still not reaching the height of the first “gilded age” (p. 110
fig.3.5).
Second, Scheidel shows convincingly that most reductions of inequality
were indeed the result of his “four horsemen”: mass mobilization war, trans-
formative revolution, state collapse, and pandemic.16
The first horseman, mass mobilization war, is best illustrated by the
effects of the two world wars. For example, in 1938 Japan was one of the
most unequal countries on earth, with the richest 1% receiving 19.9% of
income (p. 115). By 1946, that share had dropped to 6.4% (a decline of over
two thirds) (p. 115). The destruction of the elite’s wealth was even more
dramatic: the value of the richest 1% of estates fell by almost 97% between
15. P. 108. The Gini coefficient equals 1 when a single individual controls all resources
and 0 when all individuals control equal resources. P. 11. Scheidel recognizes that there may be
better measures of inequality, but the Gini is the only one that can be measured across history,
with better data for more recent periods. See pp. 12–15. Scheidel does a great job in obtaining
the best measures across time given the limitations of available data. The breadth of his exper-
tise is astonishing.
16. See chapters 4–6, 10.
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1936 and 1949 (p. 115). “Total war compressed inequality on an unprece-
dented scale” (p. 117). The same phenomenon happened as a result of both
World War I and World War II in Europe (pp. 146–47).
The second horseman, transformative revolution, is exemplified by the
effects of the Russian revolution (pp. 214–23). Scheidel estimates that before
the revolution, Russia’s 1% received about 13.5–15% of all income (p. 221).
This value fell dramatically as a result of Soviet confiscation, so that the Gini
declined from 0.362 to 0.229 (p. 221). A similar leveling occurred in China
after 1949, with the Gini declining from 0.4 to 0.23 (pp. 223–28). In France,
the income share of the top 10% declined from 51–53% before the French
revolution to 45% after it (p. 237 tbl.8.1).
The third horseman, state collapse, can be illustrated by the destruction
of the Tang elite in China in the ninth century (pp. 260–64), the disintegra-
tion of the Western Roman Empire in the sixth century (pp. 264–69), and
by contemporary Somalia (pp. 283–86). Scheidel estimates that the Gini co-
efficient in Roman Britain (as measured by relative house sizes), which stood
at 0.6 at the height of the Empire, had reverted by 600 AD to 0.4, nearly the
same as in Iron Age Britain (p. 269 fig.9.3).
The fourth horseman, plague, is best shown by the late medieval pan-
demic that began with the Black Death of 1347–1349. For example, the Gini
coefficient in the cities of Piedmont fell from about 0.72 in 1300 to about
0.61 by 1450, and the top 5% share of wealth distribution fell from 48% to
32% (p. 307 fig.10.4).
But Scheidel’s hypothesis is stronger than this: he argues that reductions
of inequality “invariably” resulted from the four horsemen (“every single one
of the major compressions of material inequality we can observe in the re-
cord was driven by one or more of these four levelers”) (pp. 6, 8; emphasis
added). Specifically, he argues that peaceful reform, such as land reform,
debt relief, normal (nonviolent) economic crises, and democratization have
not led to significant reductions in inequality (Chapter Twelve). Moreover,
he rejects the commonly accepted idea that economic development naturally
leads to reduced inequality: “[N]one of the forces discussed in this chapter
. . . can be shown to have had a consistently dampening effect on material
inequality. . . . [T]here is no escaping the fact that violence, actual or latent,
has long been a critical catalyst for equalizing policy measures” (p. 388).
We believe that Scheidel’s conclusions are too strong, and that the his-
tory of the United States in the twentieth century provides a counterexam-
ple. This, in turn, suggests that it is possible, albeit not easy, to reduce
inequality by peaceful means.
II. A Counterexample: The Great Depression and Its
Consequences, 1929–1973
In Figure 5.1, Scheidel shows the top 1% income shares in the United
States, France, Canada, and Japan from 1935 to 1975 (p. 131 fig.5.1). They
all show the same pattern: a sharp decline from the late 1930s to 1945 fol-
lowed by a much more gradual decline until 1975 (p. 131 fig.5.1). The
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sharpest fall is in Japan, but the others are not far behind (p. 131 fig.5.1).
Scheidel argues that this decline is the result of World War II and its afteref-
fects.17 But this argument presents a puzzle. How can France and Japan, both
of which suffered devastating destruction in the world war, show the same
pattern as the United States and Canada, which did not? Moreover, the de-
cline in the United States began in 1936, five years before the United States
entered the war (p. 131 fig.5.1).
In addition, Scheidel’s Figure 5.5, which shows capital income share in
total gross income for the top 1% in France, Sweden, and the United States
from 1920 to 2010, shows a gradual decline in Sweden, a very sharp drop in
France during World War II, and a less sharp drop followed by a swift recov-
ery and then gradual decline in the United States (p. 142 fig.5.5). This pat-
tern does suggest that violence had the expected impact in France, but it also
indicates that countries that were not directly impacted by World War II
(Sweden) or were involved but were not invaded (the United States) reduced
inequality by other means.
In general, Scheidel’s claim that most of the “Great Compression” can
be traced to the effects of the two world wars and therefore to “mass mobili-
zation warfare” seems overly broad.18 In the United States, World War I did
indeed cause a sharp rise in income tax rates on the rich, and therefore can
be said to have directly contributed to the decline in inequality during the
war years.19 But income tax rates were cut in the aftermath of the war, and
the 1920s in general saw a rise in inequality, which reached its all-time peak
in the United States in 1929.20
The reduction in inequality from 1936 to 1941 was not the result of war.
It was the direct result of the Great Depression and the election of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt in 1932. After his election, FDR proceeded with the large
Democratic majorities in Congress (and with significant Republican sup-
port) to enact policies that created the American welfare state (Social Secur-
ity, 1935), strengthened the labor movement (National Industrial Recovery
Act, 1933), and increased progressive taxation (the 1936 tax act).21 None of
these steps, which contributed to the reduction of inequality in the pre-
World War II years, were the result of war or violence.22
17. See pp. 169–70.
18. See p. 130.
19. See p. 144; Ajay K. Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State:
Law, Politics, and the Rise of Progressive Taxation, 1877–1929 (2013).
20. See p. 110 fig.3.5; Saez, supra note 4, at 19.
21. See Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time
162 (2013).
22. Admittedly, the years leading up to the New Deal were filled with social unrest and
violence. See, for example, the massive strikes and resulting state violence perpetrated against
strikers from the 1890s through the 1930s. These include the Great Railroad Uprising of 1877,
the Haymarket Massacre of 1886, the Homestead Strike of 1892, the Pullman Strike of 1894,
the Lawrence and Patterson strikes in 1913, the Great Steel Strike and Seattle General Strike of
1919, the San Francisco and Minneapolis general strikes of 1934, and the sit-down strikes in
Michigan. But these events do not rise to the level of Scheidel’s four horsemen. See generally
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While the World War II years further reduced inequality in the United
States, much of the constraints imposed by the government, such as the
“mass tax” (extending the income tax to the middle class) and wage con-
trols, impacted the middle class more than the rich. Moreover, the end of
the war was not followed by a cut in taxes as in the 1920s. Progressive tax
rates on the rich remained very high (over 90%) throughout the period
1945–1960, and the top marginal tax rate when Ronald Reagan was elected
was still quite high (70%).23 Moreover, the 1960s saw a massive expansion of
the welfare state with the enactment of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “War
on Poverty” program, which included Medicaid and Medicare.24 None of
these developments can plausibly be attributed to World War II, which en-
ded twenty years earlier.
It is thus hard to agree with Scheidel’s conclusion that the reduction of
inequality in the United States in the twentieth century was primarily the
result of violence. It was, instead, the result of a peaceful political reaction to
the Great Depression that led FDR to propose programs to create a social
safety net.25 The fear of the Russian Revolution was indeed an inspiration to
reform in the United States,26 but fear of revolution is not revolution, since
(contrary to Scheidel’s thesis) it does not entail actual violence.
Scheidel acknowledges the leveling effect on the Great Depression: “The
Great Depression was the only macroeconomic crisis that had a powerful
impact on economic inequality in the United States” (p. 363). To show this
inequality, he notes the decline of the wealth share of the richest 1% from
51.4% to 47% between 1928 and 1932, and of their income share from
23.9% to 15.5% over the same period (p. 363). But he argues that “income
concentration held steady until the beginning of the war” and concludes that
without the war the effect of the Depression would have leveled off.27 This
may or may not be true, but Figure 5.1 indicates that the long decline (to
1973) in the top 1% share of income in the United States began well before
the war (p. 131 fig.5.1).
Thus, while Scheidel is correct in that most dramatic reductions in ine-
quality throughout history have been the result of violence, there is at least
one counterexample to his claim. This counterexample shows that under the
right political conditions, inequality can be reduced by peaceful means. Both
FDR and LBJ were able to enact inequality-reducing measures peacefully.
Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor (2002) (dis-
cussing the history of unions and strikes).
23. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich?: Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxa-
tion, 111 Yale L.J. 1391, 1391–92 (2002) (book review).
24. See Annelise Orleck, Conclusion: The War on the War on Poverty and American Politics
Since the 1960s, in The War on Poverty: A New Grassroots History, 1964–1980, at  437,
438 (Annelise Orleck & Lisa Gayle Hazirjian eds., 2011).
25. See Katznelson, supra note 21, at 35 (describing the popular perception of the New
Deal as a kind of “salvation” of the American economy).
26. Id. at 326.
27. See p. 364.
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But this observation leads to the obvious question: why did the Great Reces-
sion of 2008–2009 not lead to a reduction in inequality?
III. Why Did the Great Recession Not Lead to Reduced
Inequality?
The Great Recession of 2008–2009 was the sharpest downturn in the
economy since the Great Depression.28 But unlike the Great Depression, it
did not lead to any reduction in inequality. Neither the bank bailout, nor the
Obama stimulus, nor even the ACA affected the Gini coefficient. Until very
recently, almost the entire growth in the economy inured to the benefit of
the top 1%.29
The second of this Review’s authors is a clinical psychologist who exper-
ienced the effects of the Great Recession directly in her practice. The follow-
ing observations are based on her experience with actual patients in her
office, and suggest some psychological reasons why the people in charge of
national policy failed to enact policies that would lead to a peaceful reduc-
tion in inequality:
In the fateful days after the demise of Lehman Brothers in September
2008, I often wondered whether the people setting national policies under-
stood the impact of their decisions on the patients I was seeing in my
office. This was not a theoretical meditation on the meaning of life. It was
born out of an urgency to support people, all of whom attempted to hold
on to the American dream: the promise is that if you work hard and hon-
estly, and if you give it your all, you will be safe. But safety was not to be
had for many of them. The storm bearing bad news never ceased. It came
in unforgiving waves of destruction. The people affected represented the
entire socioeconomic spectrum.
For a long while, it was hard to see the light at the end of the tunnel.
Fear, dismay, disbelief, horror, and feelings of helplessness dominated peo-
ple’s lives. Let me be concrete: people did lose their homes, jobs, health,
and their way of life. Relationships and marriages faltered, social relations
were severed, and shame and isolation reigned supreme. These were not
reckless people who were over leveraged and who played the stock market
like a Russian roulette. By and large, they were hopeful, highly educated,
middle aged people who were forced to pick up their shattered lives with
no relief in sight. It was, and remains, a sobering time. For some, economic
and financial recovery has yet to happen.
To be clear, the terror of the impending collapse of the auto industry
resonated so loudly that it was hard to comprehend how anybody could be
oblivious to the potential job loss of millions of people. One question that
repeatedly pierced my consciousness was: what was the psychology of the
people in charge, who led us into this calamity, and of those who were now
entrusted with navigating us out of this storm? My many years of practice
28. E.g., Bob Davis, What’s a Global Recession?, Wall Street J. (Apr. 22, 2009, 9:00
AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/04/22/whats-a-global-recession/ (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
29. See Saez, supra note 4.
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in three different states (New York, Massachusetts, and Michigan) offered
some potential hypotheses. In the winter of 2009, I wrote a draft paper
under the title “Disorders of Extreme Privilege” (DEP). I was attempting to
illuminate and understand some of the psychological dynamics involved in
the decisionmaking of people who hold power to hire and fire people and
to buy and sell companies.
I also pondered, would our leaders would ever learn from the mistakes
that led us to the crisis of 2008? Not likely, I answered. There are too few
examples in history of leaders who were able to correct course based on a
profound realization of their own faulty assumptions.30 I turned my atten-
tion to what may be the psychological phenomenon of inability to change
course in the face of an avalanche of data contradicting one’s
assumptions.31
This psychological phenomenon that I term DEP involves the ability
to isolate oneself from the pain of others and to remain dispassionate and
at times oblivious to the real-life consequences of economic and financial
decisions, oftentimes accompanied by the euphemism of “increased effi-
ciency” and “maximizing shareholder value.”32 People who suffer from this
level of isolation are at times quite fearful themselves. They fear the loss of
status, material possessions, and power. A subset of them, who ascended
from humble beginnings, employ a particularly interesting psychological
mechanism, often referred to in the literature as dissociation. “Forgetting”
their own personal history and the people who share their early histories,
they rather nurture the belief that their ascension and success is due purely
to their personal attributes and hard work, which is a conviction that al-
lows them to view the less financially fortunate as lacking in the above
attributes. Marinating in that faulty set of beliefs (that one’s own success is
purely the result of one’s special attributes) fosters, when interacting with
like-minded people, a sense of entitlement and disdain for vulnerability in
oneself and in others. Distancing from pain becomes an imperative that
ensures the resiliency of the grandiose notion that extreme success is ac-
counted for purely by one’s own attributes and actions, rather than by
one’s luck and social conditions.
30. Anwar Sadat and Yitzhak Rabin are two recent examples. Sadat made peace with
Israel after leading Egypt to war against it, and Rabin accepted the legitimacy of the Palestinian
claim to statehood after persistently denying it. See Anwar al-Sadat - Facts, Nobelprize.org,
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1978/al-sadat-facts.html [https://
perma.cc/2NV4-YKBQ]; Yitzhak Rabin - Facts, Nobelprize.org, https://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/rabin-facts.html [https://perma.cc/5VJB-TCPE].
31. This phenomenon has been documented in the psychological literature for decades.
See, e.g., Leon Festinger et al., When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological
Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the Destruction of the World (1956).
32. Jia Lynn Yang, Maximizing Shareholder Value: The Goal that Changed Corporate
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One illustration of this psychological phenomenon is the tone-deaf
objection to the auto bailout in 2009.33 The economic merit of one plan or
another notwithstanding, when millions of people were poised to lose eve-
rything they had worked for or dreamed of, pronouncing that no bailout
was necessary was the height of willful ignorance—a complete disregard
for the voiceless. These voiceless found their voices in the next decade,
much to the surprise of many who did not listen or chose to avert their
gaze from the “flyover” states.34 Flying over people’s pain is a perilous en-
deavor, I have learned.
One field of inquiry that might assist us in shedding light on the cur-
rent psychological, social, and political landscape would be the study of
interpersonal trauma and its impact on people’s lives. Ten years later, the
economic crisis can be conceptualized as a chronic trauma in one segment
of the population, with occasional exacerbations; in other words, a chronic
crisis with occasional acute crises. What began as acute anxiety in 2008 was
never resolved—it changed from acute to chronic anxiety. This chronic
anxiety is now accompanied by the well-known effects of chronic stress on
people’s bodies: a diminished immune system, depletion of hope, rising
chronic anger, demoralization, chronic health problems and substance
abuse, and, worst of all, increased social isolation, which both maintains
and reinforces hopelessness, cynicism, and dejection.35
Some people were able to recover or even surpass their 2008 success.36
But the wide swath of people who lost economic and social ground re-
mained, until recently, stubbornly out of sight and untouched by govern-
ment policies.37 Worse, many people who were less affected by chronic
crisis were able to go on with their lives,38 often unaware that the increased
anxiety about their vulnerability they now experienced has transmuted into
a ferocious commitment to holding on to their gains, so that they would
not end up like those who lost. This created a social schism characterized
by lack of compassion for people who were different and vulnerable.
33. See, e.g., Mitt Romney, Opinion, Let Detroit Go Bankrupt, N.Y. Times (Nov. 18,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/opinion/19romney.html [https://perma.cc/43G5-
W96Z].
34. See, e.g., Jim Tankersley, How Trump Won: The Revenge of Working-Class Whites,
Wash. Post (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/09/
how-trump-won-the-revenge-of-working-class-whites/?utm_term=.Affff1d4171e [https://
perma.cc/G7LH-FEG5].
35. See the well-known study of Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Mortality and Morbidity in
the 21st Century, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity (Mar. 17, 2017), documenting the
increased morbidity and mortality of white working-class Americans.
36. See, e.g., Don Lee, 5 Years After the Great Recession: Where Are We Now?, L.A. Times
(June 22, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-recession-economy-201406
22-story.html [https://perma.cc/LK72-MM6N].
37. See generally Arlie Russell Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger
and Mourning on the American Right (2016).
38. Cf. Judith Warner, What the Great Recession Has Done to Family Life, N.Y. Times
(Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/magazine/08FOB-wwln-t.html (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (“[D]espite this bleak reality, some talk persists of silver lin-
ings: less cash to spend means less materialism, a real change to ‘the definition of living
well.’ ”).
April 2018] Reducing Inequality in the Twenty-First Century 1011
The recent election, regardless of one’s political views, represents the
transformation of the pain of some who were left behind into hopefulness
that something not only should but can be done to restore the dignity and
previous social and economic standing of those who became collateral
damage in the recent wave of unbridled globalization.
A good illustration of the political manifestations of DEP and its direct
relationship to inequality is the bipartisan saga of how U.S. multinationals
amassed over $2.6 trillion of profits in low-taxed jurisdictions offshore.39
Before 1997, there were provisions in the U.S. Tax Code that were enacted in
the 1960s and that limited the ability of U.S.-based multinationals to shift
profits from high-tax to low-tax foreign jurisdictions without triggering U.S.
tax.40 The underlying theory of those provisions (“Subpart F”) was that the
corporate tax is an important bulwark against increasing inequality, since its
incidence is mostly on the rich, and that the United States should not leave
revenue on the table by allowing U.S. multinationals to escape both foreign
and U.S. tax.41 U.S. multinationals were allowed under Subpart F to defer tax
on some foreign earnings, but because of Subpart F, the revenue cost of this
provision was relatively low (below $1.5 billion a year).42
In 1997, the Clinton Treasury adopted an innocuous-seeming provision
called “check the box,” which enabled U.S. multinationals to choose whether
their foreign subsidiaries would be treated as separate subsidiaries or as
branches for U.S. tax purposes.43 The effect, which was presumably foreseen
by the drafters of the regulation, was to completely undermine Subpart F
and enable U.S. multinationals to shift profits from high- to low-tax foreign
jurisdictions without triggering U.S. tax.44 However, this money was
“trapped” offshore, since if the funds were distributed to the U.S. parent,
this would trigger a 35% U.S. tax.45
By 2004, the use of “check the box” led U.S. multinationals to amass
over $300 billion in low-taxed foreign profits offshore.46 In that year, the
39. Inst. on Taxation & Econ. Policy, Fortune 500 Companies Hold a Record $2.6
Trillion Offshore (2017), https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/pre0327.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4G5C-7E9L].
40. David L. Forst, The U.S. International Tax Treatment of Partnerships: A Policy-Based
Approach, 14 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 239, 248–49 (1996).
41. Cf. Former Senator Carl Levin, Speech at TaxCOOP Conference at World Bank (May
23, 2016), https://law.wayne.edu/carl-levin-speech-world-bank [https://perma.cc/F6F9-3ZSU]
(“[T]ax havens . . . [are] major contributors to government revenue loss and income
inequality.”).
42. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Tax Expenditures 75 (1997), https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-FY1997.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJZ7-
549Y].
43. See David L. Cameron & Philip F. Postlewaite, Incremental International Tax Reform:
A Review of Selected Proposals, 30 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 565, 571–72 (2010).
44. See id. at 580.
45. I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D) (2012).
46. Tim Dickinson, The Biggest Tax Scam Ever, Rolling Stone (Aug. 27, 2014), http://
www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-biggest-tax-scam-ever-20140827 [https://perma.cc/
LZL6-L5XF].
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Republican-dominated Congress and White House passed an amnesty that
allowed the multinationals to repatriate those funds without incurring U.S.
tax.47 This law was called the “American Jobs Creation Act.” The nominal
intent of the Act was to encourage domestic job creation,48 but subsequent
investigations have shown that the multinationals effectively used the funds
to repurchase shares and pay executive compensation, enriching their share-
holders and executives while laying off thousands of ordinary workers.49
By October 2006, it was clear that the Democrats were poised to take
over Congress50 and that the “check the box” provision might be in danger,
as a mere regulation, of being overridden by legislation.51 Therefore, the Re-
publican-dominated Congress enacted Code section 954(c)(6) as a “tempo-
rary” measure, which enshrined “check the box” in the Code.52 The
Democratic majority renewed the provision when it was due to expire in
2007 and 2008.53
When President Obama took office in January 2009, the largest interna-
tional tax revenue raiser in his first budget was repealing both “check the
box” and section 954(c)(6).54 The Democrats had large, filibuster-proof ma-
jorities in Congress and could easily have passed the repeal in 2009–2010.55
But nothing happened, and by November 2009 the repeal measure was
shelved.56 It was not resurrected again until after the Republicans took over
both the House and the Senate in 2014,57 making the repeal proposal a
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Majority Staff of S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong., Repatriating Offshore
Funds: 2004 Tax Windfall for Select Multinationals 23–25 (Comm. Print 2011).
50. Stuart Rothenberg, How High the Wave? Don’t Just Think 1994; Think 1974, 1958,
1982, Inside Elections (Oct. 26, 2006, 12:02 AM), https://insideelections.com/news/article/
how-high-the-wave-don’t-just-think-1994-think-1974-1958-1982 [https://perma.cc/YZP5-
KZ9H].
51. Cf. Kevin Drawbuagh & Andy Sullivan, Insight: How Treasury’s Tax Loophole Mistake
Saves Companies Billions Each Year, Reuters (May 30, 2013, 8:04 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-checkthebox-insight-idUSBRE94T17K20130531 [https://
perma.cc/V7P3-Y7G5] (noting that Republicans passed legislation in 2006 to make the “ ‘check
the box’ tougher to revoke”).
52. I.R.C. § 954(c)(6) (2012).
53. Drawbaugh & Sullivan, supra note 51.
54. Jeff Gerth, Corporations Couldn’t Wait to ‘Check the Box’ on Huge Tax Break, ProPub-
lica (Sept. 26, 2011, 1:51 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/corporations-couldnt-wait-
to-check-the-box-on-huge-tax-break [https://perma.cc/BC6T-NXAS].
55. Monica Davey & Carl Hulse, Franken’s Win Bolsters Democratic Grip in Senate, N.Y.
Times (June 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/us/politics/01minnesota.
html?mcubz=3 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
56. See Drawbaugh & Sullivan, supra note 51.
57. Jeremy Scott, Check the Box for Tax Avoidance, Forbes (Feb. 19, 2014, 1:42 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/02/19/check-the-box-for-tax-avoidance/#2abd6
d5f756a [https://perma.cc/Z3DC-D3BE].
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meaningless gesture by the Obama Administration. Moreover, Congress re-
peatedly passed and President Obama repeatedly signed extensions of sec-
tion 954(c)(6), most recently for five years in 2015.58
The result has been an explosion in the growth of the untaxed offshore
profits of U.S.-based multinationals. They now exceed $2.5 trillion (all accu-
mulated since the 2004–2005 amnesty),59 and the choice not to tax them is
the fourth-largest tax expenditure (i.e., a subsidy delivered through the Tax
Code or corporate welfare) in the federal budget, exceeding, for example, the
home mortgage interest deduction and the exclusion of earnings on 401(k)
accounts.60
Currently, there is bipartisan consensus that the $2.5 trillion of untaxed
offshore profits should be taxed lightly (under the House GOP plan, below
10%)61 and then allowed to be repatriated tax free and that any future off-
shore profits should be completely exempt from tax. This “territoriality”
proposal was supported by the Obama Administration, by the Hillary Clin-
ton campaign, and by both the Trump Administration and the House GOP
majority.62
IV. What Can Be Done?
Scheidel would have us believe that the only way to seriously impact
inequality in the twenty-first century is through war or revolution. Unfortu-
nately, unless something is done to reduce inequality, he may be right.
Political theorists have long sought to explain the causes of violent revo-
lutions. In general, such revolutions do not occur when the majority in a
given society is downtrodden, because people who are simply too poor to
earn a living invest their efforts in survival, not revolution. Instead, as James
Davies explained in 1962, revolutions occur after a period of sustained
growth, in which “actual need satisfaction” matches “expected need satisfac-
tion.”63 “Actual need satisfaction” refers to the extent people feel that their
various needs are met, while “expected need satisfaction” refers to the extent
58. Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, New Legislation Extends Expiring Tax Provi-
sions, Delays Taxes Imposed Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
and Enacts Revenue Raisers 3 (2015), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/
SC_Publication_Tax_Extenders_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JZE-GQL6]; Drawbaugh & Sulli-
van, supra note 53.
59. Richard Phillips et al., Offshore Shell Games 2016: The Use of Offshore
Tax Havens by Fortune 500 Companies 2, 12 (2016), http://ctj.org/pdf/offshoreshell-
games2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/W47P-A54C]; Fortune 500 Companies Hold a Record $2.6
Trillion Offshore, Inst. on Tax’n and Econ. Pol’y (Mar. 28, 2017), https://itep.org/fortune-
500-companies-hold-a-record-26-trillion-offshore/ [https://perma.cc/5Q49-LRRD].
60. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures 21–23, 33 (2015), https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-FY2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BGJ-7RPH].
61. Tax Reform Task Force, supra note 12, at 28.
62. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Proposals for International Tax Reform: Is There a Middle
Road?, 153 Tax Notes 1169 (2016).
63. James C. Davies, Toward a Theory of Revolution, 27 Am. Soc. Rev. 5, 6 fig.1 (1962).
1014 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:1001
they expect those needs to be met. If after such a period there is a sharp
downturn in actual need satisfaction, while expected need satisfaction (re-
sulting from the experience of previous years) remains high, an “intolerable
gap” arises between what people want and what they get.64 “Revolution oc-
curs at this time.”65
Davies’s “J curve” theory of revolutions has been tested many times
since Davies and applied to revolutions that happened long after him, such
as the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the “Arab Spring” of 2011.66 If the
theory holds, the United States and the rest of the Western world may be
ripe for revolution. The Great Recession followed a period of rapid growth
and resulted in a wide gap between actual and expected need satisfaction.
The election of Donald Trump may be the beginning of an attempt to rem-
edy this gap, but given the policies actually proposed by the GOP, it is un-
likely to close it. Specifically, the American Health Care Act as passed by the
GOP-dominated House would, according to the Congressional Budget Of-
fice, lead to 23 million Americans losing health insurance, cut over $800
billion from Medicaid, and steeply cut taxes for the richest Americans.67
Scheidel would presumably acknowledge that wars and revolutions are
generally not sought, even though they may reduce inequality.68 Nobody
wanted World War I, but it still happened. The current risk is that if nothing
gets done, we may slip into a twenty-first-century version of the deadly first
half of the twentieth century. World War I and World War II occurred in
part as a result of a violent backlash against the first age of globalization,
increased limitations on immigration, and heightened tariff barriers. Cur-
rent developments in the United States and in Europe offer disturbing
parallels.
What can be done to ameliorate inequality peacefully? Piketty and his
colleagues propose two major steps, both of which involve taxation: first, a
sharp increase in the marginal tax rate on the rich (up to over 90% in some
proposals), and second, a global tax on wealth.69
These proposals seem unrealistic at the present moment. The second
proposal requires an impossible level of global cooperation (including every
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See generally Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (rev. & expanded ed.
1965); Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (1970); Jack A. Goldstone et al., A Global Model
for Forecasting Political Instability, 54 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 190 (2010).
67. Cong. Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 1628, at 3–4 (2017), https://
www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/costestimate/hr1628aspassed.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/69QZ-JZ4H]; Jim Nunns et al., Tax Policy Ctr., An Analysis of the House
GOP Tax Plan 1 (2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publica-
tion-pdfs/an_analysis_of_the_house_gop_tax_plan_9-16-16.final_.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5Z7L-4HV4].
68. See p. 436.
69. Piketty, supra note 1; Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive
Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations (CESifo, Working Paper No. 3548, 2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1915957 [https://perma.cc/Y4PC-ACJ8].
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tax haven).70 The first was tried before, but as the first author has argued
elsewhere, it does not seem to have reduced inequality by much. While the
era of very high marginal tax rates (1936–1981) coincided with the “Great
Compression” and a reduction of inequality (Chapter Five), it is not clear
these two are in fact directly related. Historical evidence of effective tax rates
indicates that for most of the period 1936–1980, the actual effective tax rates
paid by the top 1% were far below the nominal rates.71
Moreover, the data for the subsequent period (1980–2009) indicate that
while the overall taxing and spending of the Federal government had a sig-
nificant downward effect on the Gini coefficient, reducing inequality by
about 20% on average, the top marginal tax rate on the 1% had very little to
do with this trend.72 This is indicated by the fact that the before- and after-
tax Gini coefficients move in parallel throughout this period, despite large
changes in the top statutory tax rate (from 70% down to 28% and then back
up to 39.6%). The only tax that seems to have a meaningful effect on the 1%
is the tax on dividends and capital gains, since there are data that indicate
that the ACA’s increase in the tax rate from 20% to 23.8% also increased the
effective tax rate of the top 1% by the same amount.73 This increase, how-
ever, is set to be abolished if the GOP majority in Congress manages to
repeal the ACA, and Speaker Ryan’s tax plan proposes a further reduction to
16.5%74 (the lowest rate on capital gains since 1916).75
If the top marginal tax rate is not an effective way of reducing inequal-
ity, what is? The data suggest that the main driver of the reduction of the
Gini from the current taxing and spending of the federal government comes
from the spending side, not from the taxing side.76 In fact, it can be shown
70. See, for example, the suggestion of Piketty’s student Gabriel Zucman of a global
wealth register. Gabriel Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax
Havens 92–98 (Teresa Lavender Fagan trans., The Univ. of Chi. Press 2015) (2013). This, too,
seems unrealistic. Even the modest coordination measures advanced by the OECD to attack
the tax evasion problems have produced a backlash. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evalu-
ating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the Benefits Principle and Proposal for UN Oversight, 6 Harv.
Bus. L. Rev. 185 (2016).
71. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Parallel March of the Ginis: How Does Taxation Relate to
Inequality and What Can Be Done About It? (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 385, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2392971 [https://perma.cc/
3R2U-AVTH].
72. See Cong. Budget Office, Cong. of the U.S., The Distribution of Household
Income and Federal Taxes, 2011, at 21–23 (2014), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/49440-distribution-income-and-taxes-2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UF5L-ZDTH].
73. Emmanuel Saez, Taxing the Rich More: Preliminary Evidence from the 2013 Tax In-
crease, 31 Tax Pol’y & Econ. 71, 75–77 (2017).
74. Kyle Pomerleau, Details and Analysis of the 2016 House Republican Tax Reform Plan,
Tax Found. (July 5, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/details-and-analysis-2016-house-republi
can-tax-reform-plan/ [https://perma.cc/5DUL-HH52].
75. See 1916 Top Federal Tax Rates, InsideGov, http://federal-tax-rates.insidegov.com/l/
1/1916 [https://perma.cc/XN59-Q762].
76. See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 72, at 25.
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that the fluctuations of the Gini in the period 1980–2009 are directly corre-
lated with spending on the “entitlements” (Social Security, Medicaid, and
Medicare).77
Thus, the most urgent way to address the inequality problem peacefully
is to bolster the entitlements. Given the retirement of the baby boom gener-
ation, more funding is needed for all of them, including the ACA. The most
obvious way of funding the entitlement is to adopt a consumption tax
(Value Added Tax, or VAT/Goods and Services Tax, or GST) at the federal
level in addition to, and not as a replacement of, the current individual and
corporate income taxes. The rationale for this claim is that the experience of
most countries has demonstrated that a VAT is the most effective way of
addressing inequality.78
Every other developed economy and most other countries (over 100)
finance their welfare state primarily from a central consumption tax (VAT or
GST).79 While these taxes are regressive, there are ways to alleviate regressiv-
ity, including exempting necessary expenditures or providing income-based
refunds. Moreover, these taxes are not regressive when the spending they are
used for is taken into account.80
A broad-based federal VAT in the United States could raise $45 billion
for every percentage point of tax per year.81 That means that a low 5% VAT
would be sufficient to raise $225 billion each year, enough to bolster Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid for the foreseeable future, as well as
strengthening rather than repealing the ACA.
Another promising peaceful way of addressing inequality involves edu-
cational opportunity.82 The American system of funding education primarily
through local property taxes is deeply flawed and results in extreme dispari-
ties between poor and rich school districts (e.g., in Michigan the difference
is over 50%).83 Funding education instead by a federal consumption tax, as
proposed by President Nixon in the 1970s, could significantly enhance edu-
cational opportunity and social mobility in poor school districts. Another
5% of VAT could finance all K–12 public education in the United States, and
77. See id. at 18, 25.
78. Avi-Yonah, supra note 71, at 5–6.
79. See Kathryn James, Exploring the Origins and Global Rise of VAT, in The VAT
Reader: What a Federal Consumption Tax Would Mean for America 15, 15 (2011).
80. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Designing a Federal VAT: Summary and Recommendations
(Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 155,
2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1422092 [https://perma.cc/VW5C-H2L7].
81. See Eric Toder et al., Implications of Different Bases for a VAT 21 (2012),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412501-Implica
tions-of-Different-Bases-for-a-VAT.PDF [https://perma.cc/KQ45-ZFAS].
82. See Raj Chetty et al., Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational
Mobility (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23618, 2017), http:/www.nber.
org/papers/w23618 lb;https://perma.cc/7MD4-CP3C].
83. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Shera Avi-Yonah, Leveling the Playing Field: The Case for an
Education Value Added Tax (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 474, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2636728 [https://perma.cc/XW7B-Z9EV].
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a third 5% could finance the much-needed rebuilding of our national infra-
structure. A total VAT of 15% would be perfectly in line with rates in other
developed countries (15% is the minimum VAT rate in the EU, and many
countries have a VAT of over 20%).84
A VAT is therefore the best way of addressing inequality peacefully. How
likely is such a VAT in the United States? There are two possible scenarios:
presidential leadership or a crisis.85
Under the first scenario, a second-term President (since it is unlikely
that any President will be elected on a tax-raising platform) proposes a VAT
as part of an overall tax reform package. Democrats will have to be con-
vinced that a VAT is the only way to address inequality, and that regressivity
can be alleviated (e.g., by payroll tax reductions). Republicans will have to be
convinced that a VAT is not just a money machine for growing government
(e.g., by making the reform revenue neutral by abolishing the corporate
tax).86
The famous VAT horror stories are the defeat of Ways and Means Chair
Al Ulmann in 1978 after he proposed a VAT87 and the landslide defeat of
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney after passing one in 1991.88 But
Ullmann was defeated for other reasons, and Mulroney mishandled the in-
troduction of the VAT. In addition, Mulroney’s conservatives came back to
power in Canada and reduced the VAT rate (but did not eliminate it). A
better example of political leadership is Australia’s John Howard, who cam-
paigned in 1996 under the promise of “never ever” introducing a VAT in
Australia. Having won, Howard then proceeded to implement that VAT in
conjunction with both business and labor and won reelection twice by large
margins.89
A VAT is not more difficult to adopt than health care reform, Social
Security, Medicare and Medicaid when they were first proposed, or civil
84. See Bruce Bartlett, The Conservative Case for a VAT, in The VAT Reader, supra note
79, at 83, 91–92.
85. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Political Pathway: When Will the U.S. Adopt a VAT?, in The
VAT Reader, supra note 79, at 334, 334–37.
86. Id. at 335–36.
87. Joseph J. Thorndike, Tax History: Is the VAT a Career Killer for Politicians?, Tax
Analysts: Tax History Project (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/
ArtWeb/21804E04DAC2A47B85257D1B0041C871?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/3JWK-
H8AW].
88. Martin A. Sullivan, VAT Lessons from Canada, in The VAT Reader, supra note 79, at
283.
89. Susan C. Morse, How Australia Got a VAT, in The VAT Reader, supra note 79, at
291. For how VATs got enacted in other developed countries, see Neil Brooks, The Cana-
dian Goods and Services Tax: History, Policy, and Politics (1992); Richard Eccles-
ton, Taxing Reforms: The Politics of the Consumption Tax in Japan, the United
States, Canada and Australia 104–06 (2007); Kathryn James, The Rise of the Value-
Added Tax (2015); and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Inexorable Rise of the VAT: Is the U.S. Next?,
150 Tax Notes 127 (2016).
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rights legislation in 1965. All it takes is an experienced, politically astute
president like FDR or LBJ.90
The other possible scenario for enacting a VAT is a fiscal crisis. This
year, the U.S. Treasury will sell thirty-year bonds maturing in 2047. By then,
the entitlements will consume the entire federal budget because of the aging
of the population, leaving no funds to pay interest.91 Presumably, foreign
investors who buy U.S. Treasuries will balk and demand higher interest rates
long before 2047. Since it is politically highly unlikely the entitlements will
be cut or income tax rates raised sufficiently to fund the burgeoning debt,
this will induce a crisis similar to 2008, but with no option other than enact-
ing the VAT.92
Enacting the VAT is under current circumstances the last and best hope
for reducing inequality peacefully. Otherwise, as Scheidel convincingly ar-
gues, we may ultimately be faced with an inevitable reduction in inequality
by violent means—the same means that have reduced it repeatedly through-
out human history.
90. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Summary and Recommendations, 63 Tax L. Rev. 285, 288
(2010).
91. Martin A. Sullivan, Introduction: Getting Acquainted with VAT, in The VAT Reader,
supra note 79, at 7.
92. See Alan J. Auerbach & William G. Gale, Déjá Vu All Over Again: On the Dismal
Prospects for the Federal Budget, 63 Nat’l Tax J. 543 (2010); Leonard E. Burman et al., Cata-
strophic Budget Failure, 63 Nat’l Tax J. 561 (2010); Rudolph G. Penner, Do We Need a VAT to
Solve Our Long-Run Budget Problems?, 63 Tax L. Rev. 301 (2010).
